IntroductionThe purpose of this article is to examine one of the largest offshore oil spills in U.S. history, the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon explosion This paper seeks to closely investigate the system and the reasons for the failure, to answer the questions underlying numerous studies on this accident: Is the Deepwater Horizon explosion inevitable? and What can we do to avoid such incidents? Within Perrow's normal accident theory, this paper aims to draw conclusions to the above questions and make recommendations for consideration in other similar oil drilling systems. Background to the Case On April 20, 2010, BP's Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded, killing eleven people and injuring 17 others. The fire continued for 36 hours until the rig sank. After the sinking, an oil spill on the seabed flowed for 87 days, resulting in a spill of national significance (BP, 2010). Numerous investigations have explored the causes of the explosion and record-breaking spill. Reports, including that of the US government, indicated faulty cement in the well, primarily affecting BP, but also rig operator Transocean and contractor Halliburton (BP, 2010; Hogue, 2010). In 2011, a White House commission accused BP and its partners of a series of cost-cutting decisions and an insufficient safety system, but also concluded that the spill was the result of "systemic" root causes and inability to create and apply both industrial practices and government policies (Broder, 2011). So far, BP is still dealing with the fallout. Legal proceedings regarding this case are ongoing, with settlements and payments costing BP more than $40 billion (Fontevecchia, 2013). Literature Review The BP accident will be reviewed under Perrow (1984)'...... middle of paper ... ...cy; this way accidents can be better controlled. Conclusion By evaluating the characteristics of BP before the accident, the paper shows that the system controlling the Deepwater Horizon was a normal accident. Many factors signal that the complexity and tight coupling found in the BP system may be widespread in other systems, which increases the likelihood of an accident increasing not only at Deepwater Horizon but also in the future. The document recommends that, to prevent such an incident, For this to happen, all parties need to be involved. Designers, developers, operators and, above all, regulators must know and understand the real potential risks and how to act accordingly. In conclusion, since accidents in the oil extraction industry are most likely unavoidable, there should be rules to keep all parties involved together. working towards an operational goal without failures.