Preliminative materialists believe that “the concept of mental events forms part of a theory that we use to interpret and apply our experience” (Freeman 94). Therefore, they would claim that qualia is simply a theory that we use. But how can we explain this qualia? Whether it is a mental construct or not, it still seems to exist. An Eliminative Materialist may be able to claim that qualia are simply an illusion, but this ultimately doesn't matter. An illusion of qualia is still qualia. Such a statement would simply constitute adding another layer, so to speak, in a theory of mind. One can reasonably conclude that any attempt to explain qualia is, at best, incoherent, and at worst nonsensical. The failure of strongeliminative materialism, together with the failure of reductive materialism, means that weakeliminative materialism suffers from the worst of both.