The descriptive theory of meaning was proposed independently by Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege as a response to some errors in the theory of reference. Description theorists propose that rather than being a simple "word-world relation", meaning arises from descriptions associated with certain objects and stored in our minds (or senses in Frege's case). Frege's and Russell's accounts of theory differ subtly in how they view descriptions. Several objections have been raised against this theory, but only the most important objections will be raised. These include Strawson's objection to attributive use. Furthermore, the problems of ignorance and error raised by Kripke cloud the attractiveness of the theory of description. The Twin Earth thought experiment decisively disproves the theory. The Descriptive Theory of Meaning The descriptive theory of meaning replaced the oversimplified theory of reference, which postulated that meaning derived from a word-world relationship. There were, however, many flaws in the underlying theory. Description theory, however, overcame this by arguing that meaning was psychological, stored as a description of the referent. Bertrand Russell's analysis of the definite article, "the", led to his analysis of definite descriptions. He broke down all the precise descriptions, expressions like 'the golden handshake' or 'the king of pop', into 3 statements based on logical analysis. For example, "the king of pop is Michael Jackson" is broken down into the following statements:1. There is at least one king of pop2. There is at most one king of pop3. Whoever is the king of pop is Michael Jackson. This analysis helps Russell avoid some of the pitfalls of baseline theory. Four particularly harmful...... half of paper......Routledge.McGlone, M. (2010). Putnam on What's Not in the Head. Philosophical Studies, 200.Russell, B. (1905). On denotation. Mind, 479. Soames, S. (2007). Reference and description: The case against two-dimensionalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 18. Stalnaker, R. (1993). Twin Earth revisited. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 302.Stephen Laurence, E.M. (1999). Moral realism and Twin Earth. Facta Philosophica, 137. Strawson, P. (1971). Logical-linguistic notebooks. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 8-9.Tanesinni, A. (2007). Philosophy of language AZ. Edinburgh, United Kingdom: Edinburgh University Press.WebsitesStanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: Narrow Mental Content - http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-narrow/ 02/04/11Stanford Encycopaedia of Philosophy: Gottlob Frege - http:// plato .stanford.edu/entries/frege/ 05/04/11